Life without electricity

I recently went to one of a series of talks (https://cambridge.resilienceweb.org.uk/) on the theme of resilience (a critical issue due to climate change increasing the frequency of severe weather) and yesterday I came across this report from the Royal Academy of Engineering [1] which gives a vivid picture of how Lancaster coped with a major power cut due to flooding in December 2015. This post gives a flavour of some of the problems described in the report. However, it was written a decade ago. Technology has changed a bit since then; below I have suggested some alternative solutions now available.

The flooding was caused by Storm Desmond which overwhelmed flood defences at local substations which then had to be turned off for safety. Power was initially off for most of one weekend – from Saturday evening to Monday morning. The cuts affected more than 100,000 people. Supply was mostly restored on the following Monday but was cut again in the evening. Large diesel generators were brought in to support local substations and the system was back to normal by Friday.

It could have been worse. This happened on a Saturday evening when schools and shops were closed and there was some recovery time before normal business resumed on Monday.

Backup infrastructure is expensive and rarely used which can make it hard to justify the expense of keeping it on standby. If the flooding was more widespread it might not have been possible to find enough backup generators.

Such events are likely to become more frequent. A similar event could also be caused by terrorism as it is hard to protect decentralised infrastructure such as the National Grid.

Many important services failed altogether; others partly failed or struggled to cope

Landline phones were OK but mobile phones worked for a few hours only.
Landline telephones continued to work as they run on power through the telephone wires, not the standard power network. However, BT and Openreach plan to switch off the analogue phone network in January 2027 [3]. After this, phones will only work if plugged into a broadband router and if the internet fails the phones will too.

Mobile phones worked for a few hours, until the phone masts' backup power batteries were exhausted - most masts have backup for at least an hour. OFCOM is considering requiring that emergency services be available for longer but this would be expensive [4]. Without internet or telephone, shops could not take card payments and ATMs did not work.

Satellite phones were not directly affected but also need power at the ground end so could only work where there was backup power. Also, at the time they were so rarely used that few people knew how to operate them.

Radio stations sent staff to nearby cities to get information from the internet.

People affected by the cuts found it hard to get information on what to do because of the lack of internet and hence social media. The main source of information remaining was local radio which operated on backup power. However, they can only report what they know – some sent staff to nearby cities where the internet was working so that they could find out what was happening and report back. 

Refuelling road vehicles required hand pumps.

All road transport was hindered by lack of power to traffic lights. Also some routes from Morecombe were closed due to flotsam causing damage to bridges across the river. Petrol stations could not deliver fuel as the pumps required electricity and in any case they could only take cash payments. 

Trains continued to work with signalling powered from outside the affected region. 

Electric trains continued to work as they used power from outside the affected region. Also, some of this power was diverted to be used for the signalling system. However many stations had to close at 4pm for lack of lighting on the platforms.

No internet directories.

Residents in the area without power could only listen to local radio for news if they had a portable radio with a battery (or some used their car radio) and if it was not already tuned to the local station they could not use the internet to look up the right frequency.

No power for heating and cooling in homes.

The weather was cold as you would expect for December but most homes heated by gas use electricity for igniting the boiler so they could not use it. Also, fridges and freezers did not have power and a great deal of food ended up being thrown out. These days homes with an EV can get equipment to run the house off the car battery for a few hours.

No power for traffic lights or for fuel pumps.

Traffic lights failed for lack of power which severely hampered traffic flow on the roads. Most petrol stations had to close because there was no power for the pumps. Buses had to be refuelled by hand pumps.

Many schools and workplaces closed because of transport issues, also heating and lighting failures.

Water and sewage services.

The water mains is distributed mainly by gravity so this was OK except for the upper floors of high rise buildings. For these residents, as well as no water in the taps, toilet cisterns would not refill. Also high rise residents had to use the stairs instead of lifts. 

Other systems reliant on the telephone/internet.

Without a working telephone system, most shops could not accept payment by debit or credit card. Alarm systems for vulnerable people in case of falls did not work (especially if they used WiFi). Also safety systems for volunteers working with challenging users (such as in a homeless shelters) could not be relied on.

Supermarkets supply systems typically require both telecomms and transport both of which were compromised by the power cuts and flooding.

Community infrastructure badly affected.

Many GP services were struggling or inaccessible so people went to hospitals as a last resort. Consequently these were overwhelmed, often with trivial queries, but sometimes potentially fatal issues. For example, there are people reliant on home dialysis to support failing kidneys and this requires power. They typically have enough battery power to safely disconnect [5] but not to run an entire session.

Who has responsibility for suspending the rules?

Regulations that are appropriate In normal times may be inappropriate in a power cut. For example, many university residences ban candles as backup lighting because of the fire risk. Lack of lighting is also a risk but who can take responsibility for suspending the rules? In this particular case, a better solution available today would be to use an LED torch instead of a candle - with a supplementary power pack if necessary. This is however a bigger investment than a candle.

Which is cheaper – resilience or failure? 

Resilience infrastructure such as flood protection and backup generators is expensive, and often hard to justify because it is so rarely used. However being flooded and having no power also has costs. Which is cheaper in the long run? This is hard to say without accurate information on frequency and cost. How can you set a value on a reliable internet?

References

[1] Living without electricity (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2016)

[2] Evidence suggests climate change played a part in Cumbria floods - Met Office

[3] Getting ready for digital phone lines for your home and business (Openreach)

[4] Ofcom Refines Thinking on Cost of Adding Power Backup to UK Mobile Sites (ISPReview, Feb. 2025)

[5] Managing home dialysis during a power cut or energy blackout (Kidney Care UK)

[6] The withdrawal of landlines and switch to digital calls (House of Commons Library)